He had the power, too, of infecting his men with his
likes and dislikes. His hatred of Davis had been for three years the
one mania of his sulking mind.
To remove him from command in such a crisis was to challenge a mutiny in
his army which might lead to serious results. Yet if he should continue
to retreat, and back out of Atlanta without a fight as he had backed out
of every position for the one hundred and fifty miles from Dalton, the
results would be still more appalling.
The loss of Atlanta at this moment meant the defeat of the peace party
of the North, and the reelection of Lincoln. If Lincoln should be
elected it was inconceivable that the South could continue the unequal
struggle for four years more.
If Johnston would only hold his trenches and save Atlanta for a few days
the South would win. Lee could hold Grant indefinitely.
The thought which appalled Davis was the suspicion which now amounted to
a practical certainty that his retreating General would evacuate Atlanta
as he had threatened to abandon Richmond when confronted by McClellan,
and had abandoned Vicksburg without a blow.
He must know this with absolute certainty before yielding to the demand
for his removal. That no possible mistake could be made, he dispatched
his Chief of Staff, General Braxton Bragg, to Atlanta for conference
with Johnston and make a personal report.
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