If these views can be sustained, it follows that Congress was justified
not only in enacting the perpetual confiscation of the _personal_
property of rebels, but need not, and should not, have passed the
explanatory clause prohibiting 'forfeiture of _real_ estate beyond the
natural life' of the rebel. So far as weakening the rebellion,
indemnifying the nation for costs and damages, or the rights and
interests of the heirs of rebels, are concerned, there is no reason in
justice or in policy for the discrimination made between personal and
real estate; if it is right and wise to take the one in perpetuity, it
is equally so to take the other. In our judgment, it is right and wise
to do both.
MILITARY ADMINISTRATION--NO ARMY OF RESERVE.
In looking over the war, we can all now see a very great error in the
_military_ administration--the neglect, namely, to provide and keep up
a proper reserved force. It is the grand mistake of the war. Two years
and a half of war, and no army of reserve! Eighteen months ago, a force
of reserve of at least two hundred thousand men should have been formed.
It could probably then have been formed of volunteers. From it,
vacancies made in the armies in the field by battle, disease, or
expiration of time of service, could have been filled with drilled and
disciplined soldiers, and reinforcements drawn to meet any special
exigency. The victory of Gettysburgh might have resulted in the total
destruction of Lee's army before he could recross the Potomac; and
Rosecrans might have been strengthened without weakening the Army of the
Potomac or any other.
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