The prevailing spirit of the act, cropping out in almost every section,
is the tenderness with which it handles the subject. It scrupulously
seeks to avoid all violence, injustice, and suffering, and while it
firmly asks the service of the people, distributes that service equally
among all. And herein is its superiority over all previous militia acts.
State and national officers, members of Congress, custom-house
officials, postmasters, clerks, and the favored and fortunate generally,
were heretofore exempt, instead of those who, by misfortune or
otherwise, were in circumstances of dependence and want.
But the act of March 3d, thus general in its application, thus humane in
its provisions, is not without omissions and imperfections. But these
arise rather from the language of its provisions, than from its general
design. Let us briefly examine these provisions as they are given in the
second section of the act.
Clause second exempts 'the only son liable to military duty of a widow
dependent upon his labor for support.'
The Judge Advocate General has decided, that 'a woman divorced from her
husband who is still living, is not in the sense of the law a widow--a
widow being defined to be a woman who has lost her husband by death.'
Her only son, therefore, upon whom she may be dependent for her support,
cannot be exempted. A divorced woman, whose husband is still living, may
thus be left entirely without support, unless she have several sons
'liable to draft,' in which case, she may elect one for exemption.
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