Hence it may be presumed, according to an admitted custom of
legal interpretation, that in the remaining clause, standing between the
other four, the question of dependence, though not expressly _stated_,
is clearly _implied_.
But an 'opinion,' published by the Provost-Marshal General's Bureau for
the guidance of the boards of enrolment, declares that 'the right to
this exemption does not rest upon the parents' dependence on the labor
of their sons for their support. The law does not contemplate any such
dependence.'
What is the result of this decision?
First, it places the wealthy and independent on the same footing with
the indigent and needy, exacting from the one no more service than from
the other.
Second, it is more lenient toward the wealthy citizen who has several
sons liable to draft, than toward the helpless widow who may have but
one.
Third, it makes a distinction against that family which may have
contributed most to the military service.
By the 'opinion' just quoted, the only fact to be established by parents
electing one of several sons 'subject to draft,' is that they are 'aged
or infirm'. When this is done, boards of enrolment must grant the
exemption. The parents may live in affluence independent of their
children; the sons may all be in the second class except the one
elected; they may reside in different districts or States; they may
belong to different households: yet, if the same parents, or some
indigent widow adjoining them, had but _one_ son 'liable to military
duty,' or, having _several_, had sent them all into the army save _one_,
that one remaining could not be exempt unless it were proven that they
actually depended on him for their support.
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